After the Anthrax attacks of 2001 that killed five American civilians, the American people and its government were in a state of panic and were very apprehensive that another terror attack would be imminent on US soil, this time in the form of bio-weaponry an attack that would “make September 11 look like child’s play” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed.[1] The Bush administration documented that al Qaeda had sought access to such weapons, but where confused as to where they could get them from. Iraq was the one country that was proposed to have access to such weaponry, and the Bush administration knew that Saddam Hussein was malicious enough to help al Qaeda in acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), due to the outcomes of the previous Gulf War where Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait which led embargos being put upon the state of Iraq under the council of the UN. With the Bush Doctrine in full effect, this could have been used as the single excuse for the eminent conflict in Iraq. However, as the United Kingdom had not approved of this doctrine they were unsure as to the legality of posing a military occupation. Even with the UK’s proposal for the US to get authorisation from the UN’s Security Council, as the conflict would not have been found to be illegitimate if they had the backing of the Security Council’s resolution, a multilateral mechanism of lawfully using force as opposed to the widely rejected claim of unilateral pre-emption.[2] Besides, this policy would not have been in the favour of the US as there were a wide range of content within the Security Council as President Chirac refused to pass on another UN resolution for authorisation of the regime change in Iraq. He made it plain and simple if the resolution was brought up he would deploy the French veto vote.
Similarly, in late 2002 both the US and allied UK published damning reports accusing the state of Iraq and Saddam Hussein of harbouring WMD, and that they both came to the conclusion that it possessed chemical and biological agents. However, under the Iraq Inquiry led by Sir John Chilcot, it was publicised that Saddam Hussein had no WMD and that the plan to invade Iraq was made solely on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments.[3] The continuous push for the narrative that Iraq possessed WMD was in part a clever strategy adopted by the US and the UK for a regime change, but they could not produce any sufficient material evidence in showing their reasoning behind this belief. In fact, the intelligence community assessed that it would take Saddam up to four or five years to gather enough fissile material to build a nuclear weapon,[4] they also established that as long as the sanctions put in place against Iraq in the early 1990’s remained it could not achieve its capabilities in acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, the decision to lead the war against Iraq, despite the lack of legality and the mandate of support from the UN Security Council, can be seen as the most dramatic form of US unilateralism to date. Ralph G. Carter [5]wrote, in his book Contemporary Cases in US Foreign Policy, how the war on Iraq provided important lessons for US foreign policy post 9/11, he implied how the Bush doctrine, the war in Afghanistan and the Iraq war all suggest that there is a very strong executive presence that is driving US foreign policy decision making. Yet, the war in Iraq determined that there are clear problems with executive dominance in foreign policy making. As there were many promoters of the war in Iraq who perpetuated the notion that with the toppling of the Saddam regime, that American diplomacy in the Middle East would be welcomed with open arms.
The Bush Revolution and it’s hindrance
George W. Bush understood the importance of being the only superpower state in the world, he also understood that he had the ability to shape the platform of politics in the global stage. For example, the war on terror was used by the Bush administration to compel other nations to follow in their steps or to at least agree that the actions that they were taking were the right ones. Consequently, he overestimated the legitimate consequences of what his unilateral policymaking’s could achieve. As he still needed the support and cooperation of other states to achieve their targets, as allowing for action to be taken in favour of an American stance then that stance has to exceed the frame of national interest and side with a more common international goal. Therefore, a major concern on behest of the Bush doctrine is that there is simply no way in regulating such a unilateral process, which would only lead to arbitrariness and a process of self-identification. Political observer Henderson, argues that the problem doesn’t necessarily lie with the US but with other less powerful states who could take this precedent and use this pre-emption to their own advantage. For example, Israel could use this as an excuse to bring harder sanctions and strikes on the people of Palestine, or China could use it to justify an attack on Taiwan, or what’s to say Iraqi or Afghani rebels would not pre-empt an attack on any US military forces whom they deem to be occupiers. Therefore, the unilateral precedent that is the Bush doctrine has detrimental effects on, not just US foreign policy but to, the global maintenance of international relations as there is an open field for anarchy to develop.
The consequences of the Iraq war and a policymaking built on the unilateralist model has had a diverse impact on US foreign policy. Firstly, you can say it has been successful as there have been no terror attacks to the same scale as 9/11 on home soil. But on the other hand, when concerned with Afghanistan the militant group al Qaeda still pose a threat to the stability and safety of the Afghani people, and the looming threat of the return of a Taliban government. As for Iraq, a country torn apart by sectarian violence, the imminent threat of the political, ideological and religious divisions within the country are far too great that it is still very problematic for the US. The supposition for the war on terror was that the Bush administration wanted to solve the crisis that was the Middle East and bring about a long lasting stability to the region. However, this did not come to fruition as, some critics of the Bush agenda on the war on terror argue that we got less out of intervening in Iraq than anyone else. There have been countless casualties on both sides, the region has been at its most unstable, and there have been an increase in anti US sentiment and a rise of militant factions. Why did Bush believe he could succeed where countless previous presidents failed miserably? Even so he created a greater divide between America and the rest of the world as there were adverse reactions towards their foreign policies. The cumulative effects of such unilateral policies angered even Americas closest allies, France and Germany, it weakened its support system and undermined the willingness to cooperate in future dealings on multilateral concerns.
Thus, the importance of unilateral policymaking by the Bush administration was quite unfounded upon as the international community supported the US on the aftermath of 9/11. The United Nations condemned the attacks and said “Nothing after 9/11 will be as it was before. A wounded superpower has not only been driven to act globally on the issue of terrorism but the entire world has responded to what is being seen as a global campaign against terrorism”.[1] The UN, the Security Council and not to mention the countless 191 members of the General Assembly all condemned the actions of September 11. So what where the definitive reason for the US to go it all alone, with its pursuit to combat the war on terror. The Bush revolution in foreign policy was spearheaded by the notion that it was the responsibility of America to go abroad and aggressively search for monsters to destroy to maximise the freedom of the American people. Bush contended that “the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past… We cannot let our enemies strike first”.[2] He had a hegemonist world view and suspected multilateral agreements and institutions as being unnecessarily beneficial to American interests. Hence, the Bush doctrine justified the use of pre-emptive warfare and by putting too much power in the hands of an already powerful nation made them inexplicably dangerous. Unable to convince other nations to accept the privilege that the US holds and their unwillingness to comply with the adamants of other nations, the US has retreated into a unilateral bubble that has hindered its future national interests. By their act to withdraw from international agreements that they deemed to be unacceptable. Continuously, does this revolution represent the high mark of imperialism in US foreign policy of the 21st century, as future presidents will undoubtedly follow this doctrine of unilateral proportion. Also, with the increase of the defence budget by some $300 billion since the year 2000 the war on terror wages on in the far corners of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, South East Asia, and North Africa. The struggle for the control of US foreign policy continues to this day.
[1] Daalder, I. and Lindsay, J., 2005. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution In Foreign Policy. 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: Brooking Instituion Press.
[2] Henderson, C., 2004. The Bush Doctrine: from theory to practice. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, [online] 9(1), pp.3–24. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article/9/1/3/807867.
[3] Sengupta, K., 2016. Exaggeration And Omission: Chilcot Has Delivered His Damning Verdict On The Iraq War. [online] The Independent. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/chilcot-report-intelligence-was-exaggerated-and-omitted-to-justify-iraq-war-inquiry-finds-a7122481.html
[4] MacAskill, E., 2016. Spy Agencies ‘Produced Flawed Information On Saddam’s Wmds’. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/spy-agencies-flawed-information-saddam-wmds-iraq-chilcot>
[5] Carter, R., 2005. Contemporary Cases In U.S. Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
[6] Dhanapala, J., 2007. The United Nations Response to 9/11. Terrorism and Political Violence, [online] 17, pp.17–23. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546550590520537
